On This Day In History : 13/14 February 1945

This day in 1945, 13/14 February: Dresden

RAF Bomber Command opens what will become one of the most controversial aerial
bombardments in the history of the Combined Bomber Offensive – the raids on the city of Dresden by the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the night and by the United States Eighth Army Air Force (8 AF) during the following days.

Pre-War Dresden

One title 'Pre-War Dresden' across all three photos. Credits 1 and 2 are Bundesarchiv 3 is Library of Congress

Bundesarchiv

Bundesarchiv

Bundesarchiv

Library of Congress

Dresden is a city in south-east Germany, famed for its architectural, cultural and historic importance. In February 1945, it was largely destroyed by British and American bombing, with huge loss of life.

Bomber Command critics often cite Dresden as an example of indiscriminate “terror bombing”, which was indeed a phrase later used by Churchill. Critics say the city was effectively undefended, of no military significance, crowded with innocent refugees and the war was nearly over. Documentary evidence is contradictory. According to the War Office briefing teams, it was not being used as a transport centre for the German armies in the east, but at the same time, The National Archives contain multiple Dresden Target Files (Air 34 series), covering railway stations, marshalling yards, bridges; armament factories – including even an alleged poison gas factory – airfield and radar facilities. And there were broader strategic – and indeed political – considerations in play.

1944 reconnaissance photo with river and major items of interest numbered and labelled

1944 reconnaissance photo with river and major items of interest numbered and labelled (National Archives AIR 34/598)

Individual bridge: note pre-war photo in corner, probably lifted from a Baedeker Guide Book

Individual bridge: note pre-war photo in corner, probably lifted from a Baedeker Guide Book (National Archives AIR 34/607)

The next three-power conference (Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin) was due to be held in Yalta 4-11 February 1945 (previously explained in a Blog that day). The conference was crucial as it was to determine the balance of power in Europe after Germany had been defeated. However, in the west, following the failure of the September 1944 attempt to seize the Arnhem bridge (Operation Market Garden) and the shock December 1944 German attack in the Ardennes (“Battle of the Bulge”), coupled with bad weather, the western allies were stalled. Whereas in the east, the Red Army was rampaging through eastern Europe and into Germany itself, almost within artillery range of Berlin. Accordingly, a show of strength was necessary and one which would be perceived as also supporting Soviet forces.

The desire to provide some tangible assistance to the Soviet armed forces led to the conception of a plan, codenamed Thunderclap, to disrupt German defensive operations by striking at vital urban centres where, as Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, noted on 26 January 1945, “a severe blitz will not only cause confusion in the evacuation from the East but will also hamper the movement of troops from the West.” The Joint Intelligence Committee considered the benefits of such an attack as being the dual outcomes of disrupting German communications to the eastern front and creating confusion amongst the vast numbers of refugees fleeing westwards. As well as Berlin, Harris suggested attacks on Chemnitz, Dresden and Leipzig. Churchill became aware of the JIC’s concept and on 26 January, he pressed the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, “I asked [on 25 January] whether Berlin, and no doubt other large cities in East Germany, should not now be considered especially attractive targets. Pray report to me tomorrow what is going to be done.” Moreover, the possible advantages of such attacks were not lost on Soviet military leaders. At Yalta on 4 February, General Antonov advocated air attacks against communication centres, including Berlin and Leipzig, resulting in the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff instructing Harris to proceed. This makes Churchill’s subsequent criticism of the Dresden raid particularly galling and insulting to the RAF aircrews.

The Combined Bomber Offensive, agreed between Churchill and Roosevelt at their Casablanca Conference in January 1943, called for round-the-clock bombing of Germany: the US Eighth Air Force by day and Bomber Command by night. With Dresden identified as a suitable ‘Thunderclap’ target, the Eighth Air Force was tasked with a daylight attack on Dresden for 13 February but this was cancelled due to poor weather; 8AF did not mount any major attacks that day. So the RAF raid on the night of 13/14 February 1945 was the first, with 796 Avro Lancasters and 9 de Havilland Mosquitoes of RAF Bomber Command attacking in two waves separated by a gap of three hours; the first wave comprised solely 5 Group squadrons, the second, Main Force using the radio call-sign ‘Platerack’ comprised solely Lancasters drawn from 1, 3, 6 and 8 Group. Between them, they dropped 1,478 tons of high explosive and 1,182 tons of incendiaries on the city. (The Stop Bombing call-sign from the Master Bomber would have been Hockey Stick and Abandon was Grease Gun.)

Navigator's map: gone are bright blue rivers, red roads and green forests. Drab colours are what it really looks like in the dark at 20,000 feet. Easier to match against a radar plot.

Navigator’s map: gone are bright blue rivers, red roads and green forests. Drab colours are what it really looks like in the dark at 20,000 feet. Easier to match against a radar plot. (National Archives AIR 34/598)

It was by then standard practice for the Pathfinder Force to mark and attack a target, with the Main Force following on 3 hours later. Delaying Main Force in this way had two benefits to the attackers: the German night fighters – still a major threat – would be out of fuel and forced to land; and the stricken city would have been flooded with firemen and rescue workers (colloquially now known as a ‘double tap’).

Pilot's map: shows track, turning points, speed and altitude. Blue pencil notes are Path Finder Target Indicators to look for.

Pilot’s map: shows track, turning points, speed and altitude. Blue pencil notes are Path Finder Target Indicators to look for. (RAF Museum X001-3551-005).

Specific maps were issued to aircraft captains, giving course, turning points, speed and altitudes for the whole route, plus the method of marking to be used by Path Finder Force (PFF) – what sort of Target Indicators to expect – and to ignore the German decoys! For Dresden, PFF used Wanganuui, the least accurate. This method relied upon a PFF aircraft locating the target by H2S radar then dropping sky markers – parachute flares – used by the bombers as the aiming point. As these drifted away, the Master Bomber would order the PFF ‘supporters’ to drop more TIs in the correct place. Also affecting accuracy was ‘creep back’, the tendency of nervous bomb aimers to drop a few seconds early, as soon as they saw the edge of the target, their fires encouraging the next bomber to drop his own few seconds too soon. Harris contemptuously called these crew ‘rabbits’, as they scuttled for home. Bomber Command soon got wise to this and selected an Aiming Point on the far side of the city, so creep back would fall across the centre. Nevertheless, on one Berlin raid, creep back extended for 30 miles away from the Aiming Point.

Navigator's map. Long curved route is to stay behind front lines as long as possible to reduce time over-enemy defended areas. Manuscript notes bottom left are verdict of Squadron Navigator Leader on plot kept.

Navigator’s map. Long curved route is to stay behind front lines as long as possible to reduce time over-enemy defended areas. Manuscript notes bottom left are verdict of Squadron Navigator Leader on plot kept. (RAF Museum X008-7671)

RAF Museum’s Reading Room (Hendon) has the Navigation map and log written by a navigator of 44 Squadron showing he was crew in Lancaster ‘J’, Captain Flying Officer Fugger. Upon return, the Squadron Navigator Leader has annotated it ‘A very good sortie – no major faults to be found and the best you have done so far’.

Navigator's Log: 2220 Bombs gone. Note outside air temperature minus 12 [Fahrenheit = minus 24.4 Celsius]

Navigator’s Log: 2220 Bombs gone. Note outside air temperature minus 12 [Fahrenheit = minus 24.4 Celsius] (RAF Museum X008 7671)

10. Photo by early Path Finder showing incendiaries just taking hold. Original caption explains that later, streets will be seen as dark between burning buildings

Photo by early Path Finder showing incendiaries just taking hold. Original caption explains that later, streets will be seen as dark between burning buildings (RAF Museum P023303)

His log records that the Master Bomber called his Lancaster in at 2210 hrs. and was ordered to ‘bomb glow of TIs’ (Target Indicators). The log also references ‘A/C in flames ahead’. Another Navigation Log, this time by a 90 Squadron Lancaster WP.B, Captain Flying Officer Hanger, reports bombing at 0135½ and notes at 0228 ‘fires only just visible’ by when the aircraft would have been 100 miles or so away. Yet another aircraft reported the fires being visible at a distance of 200 miles and the Wireless Operator’s diary noted: ‘I felt very sorry for the people of Dresden’. Recommended by this author as a very personal and authentic record of his service life, including losing his captain when the aircraft was shot down and being taken prisoner. He returned to flying after repatriation and the last entry in his log book was January 1947 (RAF Museum X003-9924/001).

8th Air Force returns 17 February (USAF) NOTE although the contemporary 8AF caption states 17 February, no attacks on Dresden were recorded in the War Diary for that day, nor in the Interpretation Report. Note also that when the Bombardier in the Group leader's aircraft drops his bombs, all other Group aircraft drop simultaneously, creating a bomb field of about 1 square mile on an allegedly 'precision' target. (USAF)

8th Air Force returns 17 February (USAF) NOTE although the contemporary 8AF caption states 17 February, no attacks on Dresden were recorded in the War Diary for that day, nor in the Interpretation Report. Note also that when the Bombardier in the Group leader’s aircraft drops his bombs, all other Group aircraft drop simultaneously, creating a bomb field of about 1 square mile on an allegedly ‘precision’ target. (USAF)

On 14 February, 8AF launched 1,377 heavy bombers (1,002 Boeing B 17 Flying Fortresses and 375 Consolidated B 24 Liberators) against a variety of targets across Germany: 311 B 17s were assigned to Dresden, dropping 771 tons of bombs. The whole aerial armada had the benefit of 962 fighters (all North American P 51D Mustangs except for 49 Republic P 47 Thunderbolts of 56th Fighter Group) and the following day, 15 February, a further 211 B 17s attacked Dresden’s railway junctions: these were the stated targets but the subsequent intelligence analysis noted that there was solid cloud cover, so the bombers would have aimed using H2X radar, no more accurate than the RAF by night.

Post-strike reconnaissance: note buildings still burning

Post-strike reconnaissance: note buildings still burning in the images below. (RAF Museum PC/71/19/1227)

(RAF Museum PC/71/19/1227)

(RAF Museum PC 72-202-58)

In terms of damage, a ‘fire storm’ developed, as in Cologne and Hamburg in previous years, which, combined with the high explosive bombs, destroyed large areas. The nature of a fire storm means estimates of casualties are very imprecise: contemporary reports suggested up to 135,000 but a more recent German estimate is in the region of 25,000. The first summary paragraph of Interpretation Report K 4741 written in April 1945 reads:

‘Damage in the city of Dresden is concentrated and intense and it is estimated that in the fully built-up area 89% is destroyed. The old town, which comprises the greater part of this area, is almost completely wiped out, and the majority of buildings in the inner suburbs are gutted. In the outer suburbs, however, few buildings have been affected by the attacks and there is practically no scattered damage.’

15. March 1945: virtually every building visible has lost its roof

March 1945: virtually every building visible has lost its roof (National Archives AIR 34/606)

RAF Interpretation Map assessing damage

RAF Interpretation Map assessing damage (National Archives AIR 34/606)

By early 1945, such was the power of both Bomber Command and the ‘Mighty Eighth’ that as well as sending 796 Lancasters and 9 Mosquitoes to Dresden, Bomber Command was also that same night able to despatch 326 Halifaxes, 34 Lancasters and 8 Mosquitoes against a synthetic oil plant near Leipzig. And 71 Mosquitoes to Magdeburg, 16 to Bonn, 8 each to Misburg and Nuremberg. Plus 6 Mosquitoes to Dortmund; 65 Radio Counter Measures flights and 59 Mosquito night-fighter intruder patrols, supporting the ‘heavies’. A grand total of 1,406 sorties with a loss of 9 aircraft.

The 13/14 February raid by Bomber Command was the first RAF attack on Dresden but 8AF had been before: 7 October 1944 30 B 17s dropped 72.5 tons and 16 January 1945 138 B 24s dropped 341.8 tons. The RAF did not return but 21 March saw the intelligence report record a final attack by 8AF but given the vagaries in historic records, this is not recorded in Freeman’s ‘Mighty Eighth War Diary’.

The Aftermath

One caption across 18, 19 and 20 'The Aftermath' 18 = (Bundesarchiv)

Bundesarchiv

IWM HU 44924

Library of Congress

Library of Congress

For Bomber Command, Dresden was just one of a series of standard area attacks on major urban centres, fully compliant with then Government policy. Air Marshal Harris – don’t call him ‘Bomber Harris’, that was a press-inspired name: his men called him ‘Butch’, not for any personal characteristics but an abbreviation of ‘Butcher’, because he killed so many aircrew each night – is often held responsible for introducing the policy of ‘indiscriminate’ area bombing of civilians. But the reality is that the policy he implemented – albeit with enthusiasm – was introduced from the highest levels just a week before he was appointed (23 February 1942). Recognising the failure of attempts at precision bombing by night, Churchill and the War Cabinet looked for alternatives and settled upon what became known as “dehousing policy”.
Churchill’s personal scientific adviser, Professor Frederick Lindemann (later ennobled as Lord Cherwell), concluded that if Bomber Command couldn’t hit specific factories, the best way to reduce industrial and military output was to demolish the workers’ houses. The summary in Lindemann’s report to Churchill on 30 March 1942 bears reproduction in full as it goes to the very heart of the RAF’s night bombing strategy:

“The following seems a simple method of estimating what we could do by bombing Germany.
Careful analysis of the effects of raids on Birmingham, Hull and elsewhere have shown that, on the average, one ton of bombs dropped on a built-up area demolishes 20–40 dwellings and turns 100–200 people out of house and home.
We know from our experience that we can count on nearly fourteen operational sorties per bomber produced. The average lift of the bombers we are going to produce over the next fifteen months will be about 3 tons. It follows that each of these bombers will in its life-time drop about 40 tons of bombs. If these are dropped on built-up areas they will make 4000–8000 people homeless.
In 1938 over 22 million Germans lived in fifty-eight towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, which, with modern equipment, should be easy to find and hit. Our forecast output of heavy bombers (including Wellingtons) between now and the middle of 1943 is about 10,000. If even half the total load of 10,000 bombers were dropped on the built-up areas of these fifty-eight German towns the great majority of their inhabitants (about one-third of the German population) would be turned out of house and home.
Investigation seems to show that having one’s home demolished is most damaging to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relatives killed. At Hull signs of strain were evident, though only one-tenth of the houses were demolished. On the above figures we should be able to do ten times as much harm to each of the fifty-eight principal German towns. There seems little doubt that this would break the spirit of the people.
Our calculation assumes, of course, that we really get one-half of our bombs into built-up areas. On the other hand, no account is taken of the large promised American production (6,000 heavy bombers in the period in question). Nor has regard been paid to the inevitable damage to factories, communications, etc., in these towns and the damage by fire, probably accentuated by breakdown of public services.”

But this only reinforced Air Ministry Directive S.46368 of 14 February 1942 , which ordered Bomber Command to attack named industrial areas in the Ruhr (within range of the then new Gee electronic navigational equipment) as primary targets with those outside Gee range – including Berlin – as secondary targets, to be attacked when primary targets were not feasible because of weather or other operational constraints. Because of the secret nature of Gee and the certainty the Germans would be able to break and then jam it, probably within 6 months, the cardinal principle was to concentrate on one target until destroyed.
The objective of the directive was:

“To focus attacks on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular the industrial workers. In the case of Berlin harassing attacks to maintain fear of raids and to impose Air Raid Precaution measures”.

Again, to emphasise that this was an area bombing directive, it is important to note that the following day, 15 February, the Chief of the Air Staff, Portal, queried the Directive with its author, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff:

“ref the new bombing directive: I suppose it is clear the aiming points will be the built up areas, and not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories where these are mentioned in Appendix A. This must be made quite clear if it is not already understood.”

Churchill made a remarkable – and disgraceful – contribution to the debate on the ethics of bombing when on 28 March 1945, using the expression ‘terror’ when questioning the results of his own policies. He wrote to the Chiefs of Staff:

“It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed …”

Churchill continued – entirely reasonably – that Germany was defeated and that further damage to cities would only increase the burden of reconstruction the Allies would face. But to describe the policies of destruction of morale and ‘dehousing’ he himself had espoused as ‘terror’ – mimicking the German term ‘terrorflieger’ – was either rank hypocrisy or a lapse of memory or judgement. The Chief of Air Staff could not accept this and insisted that Churchill wrote a second version, now referring to “so-called ‘area bombing'”.

[The development of Bomber Command’s strategies from individual daylight attacks on strictly military targets to ‘area bombing’ is very well expostulated in Chapter 10 of Bomber Command War Diaries, see Bibliography.]

Final thought: it is a mistake to consider historical events using present-day ethical standards. During the Second World War, with such notable exceptions as Canon Collins, Chaplain at Bomber Command Headquarters, High Wycombe – later to found the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament – Mr Richard Stokes MP and of course Conscientious Objectors, citizens in the UK and USA largely applauded bombing as a means of retribution retaliation and self-preservation for Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam, Coventry, London Blitz, Plymouth, Liverpool ….. etc. And Pearl Harbor. A popular music hall song was “Berlin or bust, we didn’t want to do it but we must”. Young men about to invade Singapore and the Japanese Home Islands – predicted to cost 1 million Allied casualties – would survive and go home, thanks, they believed, to strategic bombing and the atomic bombs. And on 27 January 1945, the first, sketchy, reports were emerging on the BBC of the Red Army’s liberation of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp and the appalling scenes there.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent those of the RAF Museum.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING

  • Royal Air Force 1939-45 Volume 3 The Fight is Won: Hilary Saunders HMSO
  • Bomber Command War Diaries: Middlebrook and Everett, Viking Press
  • Bomber Command: Max Hastings, Pan Military Classics
  • Destruction of Dresden: David Irving, William Kimber
  • Mighty Eighth War Diary: Roger Freeman, Arms and Armour Press
  • Auschwitz liberation BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january27/newsid_3520000/3520986.stm
  • Film from attacking Lancaster https://film.iwmcollections.org.uk/record/29666
  • 44 Squadron Navigation Log and map RAF Museum X008 7671
  • 90 Squadron Navigation Log and map RAF Museum X003-4699/001/002
  • Captains’ maps RAF Museum X001-3551/005
  • National Archives:
    • AIR 34/598 Dresden: Hauptbahnof railway centre: target information
    • AIR 35/605 Dresden: interpretation report and photographs
    • AIR 34/606 Dresden: interpretation report and photographs
    • AIR 34/607 Dresden: interpretation reports photographs and tactical
About the Author

Norman Brice: Volunteer

Volunteer Norman Brice

It all started very many years ago when, lying in my pram, I was awoken by what I later knew as Spitfires on their finals to RAF Biggin Hill, just a handful of miles away. As a schoolboy I was captivated by the annual September Battle of Britain Days at Biggin Hill with a vast range of visiting aircraft, including all three V-Bombers in gleaming anti-flash white.

Fast forward very many years past retirement I joined the RAF Museum London as a volunteer as a Vulcan and Cold War tour guide.